intelligence does not win wars. It does not shape foreign policy. Nonetheless, intelligence activities are an inseparable part of the policymaking process. On might think of the intelligence game conducted in the context of various paradigms of international relations. It is one cog in the mighty machine of command, an accessory to help the commander make decisions.
In this paper I will concentrate on a particular example in the field of military intelligence. In general terms, military intelligence is charged with gathering and evaluating information about the enemy vvhilst preventing him from discovering what your own forces are doing. This is a revised version of the paper presented in the Seminar on "Spying in the Ottoman Empire", the Skilliter Centre for Ottoman Studies, Newnham College, Cambridge, 29 April 1995.
THE TURKISH YEARBOOK
[.
The accelerated pace of hislorical change and technological innovation have generated new forms of estrangement that can no longer be fully understood or adequately mediated by traditional intellectual and diplomatic practices. The development of military technology, the improvement of warships, fırearms and fıeld artillery, created a growing need for inteiligence concerning the nature of military operations.
At the end of the 19th century the first purely military inteiligence organisations in the modern sense emerged. The 20th century vvitnessed increasingly evident links between the development of science and technology, the changing nature of warfare and the increasing role of inteiligence. This interaction became clearly visible in the First World War. The grovving use of advanced technology in warfare went hand in hand with the increasing relevance of technology for inteiligence collection.
With the outbreak of the First World War ad hoc "inteiligence Corps" were established within the British Forces, first in the Western Front. The "inteiligence Corps" proved so successful that, as the war expanded, other inteiligence Corps or special branches were formed in most theatres. These theatre inteiligence units varied in size and organisation according to local needs.
Wartime inteiligence organisation in the lands of the Ottoman Empire was almost as confused as the empire itself. At the beginning of the war, one of the most complex tasks of inteiligence for the British forces was the collection and assessment of material on the Turkish Army in the Middle East. This theatre was vast and the needs for inteiligence was considered exceptionally pressuring. The Turks had small forces fıghting the British, but large reserves in Anatolia. Even if one could acquire complete knowledge of the Turkish army's order of battle and intentions and determine the location and movement of every single Turkish division, further problems were at hand. Turkish formations were often identified only by the name of their commander. 'So-and-so's force' might be a regiment or a corps, and its identification was changed vvithout warning.
The Turkish Army, moreover, was organised with less regularity than those of western Europe. In December 1915, for instance, the British commander in Egypt wrote that "ali calculations as to what the Turks and Arabs can or cannot do generally are wrong; it is impossible to get any information of what is being done in regard to preparations". Perhaps. Rawlinson had inherited his father's taste for risky exploits.
Ravvlinson in the Caucasus:
Ravvlinson first came to the region in June 1918, part of an expeditionary force in Northern Iraq. The disintegration of the Russian armies follovving the Bolshevik Revolution of November 1917 had created a large and totally undefended gap in the Caucasus. This special force, knovvn as the 'Hush-Hush' Army, was trying to control this area and prevent the German and Ottoman forces from putting the strategic locations in the region under their control. These operations were directed by Major-General Lionel C. Dunsterville, the hero of Kipling's novel Stalky aııd Co.
7 Dunsterville had been appointed chief of the British mission to the Caucasus and also British representative at Tiflis in January 1918.
8 His sphere of work was to extend över ali Russian and Turkish territories south of the main chain of the Caucasus. The primary military objective of Dunsterville's mission was defıned as "the maintenance of an effective force on the Caucasus front so as to protect the occupied portions of Turkish Armenia and to prevent the realisation of Pan-Turanian designs".
9 To achieve this objective Dunsterville vvas to cross the 650 miles betvveen Baghdad and Enzeli and from there to embark his men for Baku and Tiflis. Starting from early June, Turkish troops vvere coming closer to the line Dunsterville vvas trying to hold. 12 The Turkish army vvas rapidly advancing tovvards Baku and the city vvas surrounded by mid-June. In the face of this danger, the Hush-Hush army vvas ordered to send a total of tvvo British battalions, vvith supporting artillery and armoured cars, to Baku. 13 However, this small force was totally inadequate even for the purpose of compelling the Turks to raise the siege of Baku. 15 And on the night of 14 September, with Baku under heavy attack, Dunsterville loaded his men on ships and left the city to its fate. Rawlinson managed to load most of the ammunition on to a little ship and left the city with large quantities of explosive. This was the only success of the mission. British attempts to convince the Turks to take an anti-Bolshevik stand in the Caucasus failed because the British did not, and could not, offer any firm and substantial guarantee to the Turks. Karabekir gave the issue serious consideration and circulated the demands of Ravvlinson to the other nationalist leaders. But first he vvanted to see some solid evidence of the British commitment. The British proposals vvere, hovvever, clearly self-serving and possibly suspect in their eagerness to foster the idea of British-Turkish cooperation against Boshevism. Karabekir finally came to the conclusion that pp. 148-9. Rawlinson describes in his memoirs his first impression of this important fortress vvhich stands in the shelter of mountains at a height of 7,000 feet: "The vvinds there blovv vvith terrific force, and the piercing cold defies ali furs...No tree or shrub of any sort can be found vvithin över 50 miles, either to afford fuel when cut or shelter of any kind, and the vvords 'dismal', 'dreary', 'desolate', and 'damnable', suggest themselves irresistable as a concise description of the vvhole locality." (Ibid., p. 180) 
Ravvlinson's World:
And finally, a fevv vvords about Ravvlinson's vvorld, or rather the vvorld as it vvas described by Ravvlinson.
Ravvlinson vvas a typical 'Great Game' player. His contemporaries describe him as a "charming offıcer" vvho liked "more important and dangerous vvork". "A personality of...unusual type", and a "gentleman adventurer". Admiral Sir Percy Scott, vvho vvrote the General Introduction to Ravvlinson's memoirs, describes him as an amazing adventurer vvho vvas "the most daring of fliers". 29 He further comments on Ravvlinson by saying the follovving: "I could not have had a more charming offıcer to deal vvith; the more diffıcult the job I gave him the more he seemed to like it." 30 The vvorld, described by Ravvlinson and those vvho shared his adventures, appears to be so completely satisfying that it remains more real to them than anything in normal/civilian life. In contrast to real life vvhich is complex, confusing and vvithout obvious mission, the vvar vvas a time vvhen frontiers stili existed. And the individual's social role vvas both clear and 
